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In this paper, I critique the claim that a theory’s Ramsey sentence (or
something like it) is a good candidate for encoding that theory’s structural
content, by showing that such a claim leads to implausible criteria of the-
oretical equivalence.
1 Introduction
This paper is about the so-called Ramsey-sentence approach to structural realism.1 As is
well-known, taking the structural content of a theory to be expressed by its Ramsey
sentence leads to a trivialisation problem, since the process of Ramseycation appears
to wash out all non-empirical content (save that concerning cardinality). This concern
is known as the Newman problem.2 The basic question I want to ask here is the follow-
ing: can we, with sucient ingenuity, modify the Ramsey-sentence approach so as to
avoid the Newman problem; and can we do so in a way that delivers a plausible con-
ception of a theory’s structural content? My answer to the rst question will be “yes”;
my answer to the second will be a (somewhat cautious) “no”.
The structure of the below is as follows. First, §2 briey reviews the formalisms of
rst- and second-order model theory, and introduces the Ramsey sentence. §3 intro-
duces the Newman problem. §4 and §5 consider whether moving to (respectively)
frame or Henkin semantics for second-order logic could be the basis of a feasible re-
sponse to the Newman problem; whilst §6 looks at whether employing modal re-
1[Maxwell, 1971]
2For a useful overview of the Newman problem, see [Ainsworth, 2009].
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sources will do so. Having concluded that none of these ideas is enough by itself, §7
looks at whether combining them will do the trick. §8 concludes.
2 The Ramsey sentence
In what follows, I will suppose that the theory with which we begin comprises a set
of sentences of rst-order logic. Obviously, this isn’t a realistic assumption, but it’s
perfectly in order given the aim of this paper: if the Ramsey sentence approach cannot
deliver a plausible conception of structural content in this (highly idealised) case, then
it is very unlikely to be able to deal withmore complex or realistic examples. I will also
simplify things by considering only languages without constants or function-symbols
(save for a brief discussion in §?? below). I’ll begin by briey reviewing the relevant
aspects of rst-order model theory, as much to x notation as anything else.
So, a signature is a set Σ of monadic and polyadic predicates. Given a signature Σ,
one can dene the set of well-formed rst-order Σ-formulae, using the standard compo-
sitional rules of rst-order predicate logic. I’ll denote that set as L1(Σ). A rst-order
Σ-sentence is a Σ-formula containing no free variables.
The semantics for L1(Σ) is given by rst-order Σ-structures. A Σ-structureM con-
sists of
• A setM (which will sometimes be denoted as |M|)
• For each n-ary R ∈ Σ, a set RM ⊆Mn
I will refer to a subset ofMn as an (n-ary) extension overM.
A Σ-structureM determines the truth or falsity of elements of L1(Σ), relative to
a variable-assignment g forM (i.e. a map from the variables to M ): ifM makes a
formula φ true relative to g, we writeM[g] |= φ. The truth-value assigned to φ byM
and g is determined by the standard recursive clauses. For example, the clause for
determining the truth-value of a formula of the form ∃xφ is
• M[g] |= ∃xφ i for some a ∈M ,M[gxa ] |= φ.
where gxa is an assignment which diers from g on at most x, and is such that g(x) = a.
Given a variable x and an individual a ∈ M , I’ll use x 7→ a to denote an arbitrary
assignment which assigns a to x. If φ is a sentence, then the variable-assignment no
longer matters, and we may write simplyM |= φ.
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A theory T in the signature Σ (for short, Σ-theory) is a set of Σ-sentences.3 A Σ-
pictureM is said to be amodel of T if it satises each member of T ; we denote the class
of all models of T by Mod(T ).
The Ramsey sentence is a sentence of second-order logic, so it will also be valuable
to briey review that second-order model theory. Syntactically, second-order logic
goes beyond rst-order logic by introducing new variables. For each n ∈ N, we in-
troduce a stock of n-ary relation-variables. Relation-variables will typically be denoted
X,X1, X2, . . . , Y, Y1, Y2, . . . . We nowmodify the standard formation clauses for formu-
lae, in two ways. First, atomic formulae can now be formed using relation-variables
rather than predicates: if X is an n-ary relation-variable, then Xx1 . . . xn is an atomic
sentence. Second, we can now quantify over second-order variables, not just rst-
order variables: that is, if φ is a formula and X a relation-variable, then ∃Xφ is a
formula. If Σ is the set of predicate-letters, we will refer to the language generated
over Σ by these rules as L2(Σ).
The standard semantics (also known as the full semantics) for second-order logic
goes as follows. A full structureM for L2(Σ) consists of the same data as a Σ-structure:
that is,
• A setM
• For each n-ary R ∈ Σ, a set RM ⊆Mn
Such a structure evaluates formulae ofL2(Σ) relative to a rst-order variable-assignment
g, and a second-order variable-assignment G: an arity-respecting map from the second-
order variables to extensions overM. For the newatomic formulae, the relevant clause
is
• M[g,G] |= Xx1 . . . xn i 〈g(x1), . . . , g(xn)〉 ∈ G(X)
whilst for formulae formed using the new quantiers, the clause is
• M[g,G] |= ∃Xφ i for some E ∈ P(Mn),M[g,GXE ] |= φ
where GXE is a variable-assignment just like G, save that it assigns E to X .
For the purposes of forming the Ramsey sentence, suppose that the signature Σ of
T is the union of two disjoint signatures, Ω and Θ: Θ contains the vocabulary that is to
3In accordance with standard practice in model theory, I don’t require theories to be deductively
closed.
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be Ramseyed, whilstΩ contains the vocabularywe are going to refrain fromRamsey-
fying. The labels “Θ” and “Ω” are used because the classic formulation of these issues
supposes that we Ramseyfy the “theoretical” vocabulary but not the “observational”
vocabulary. We will suppose that Θ = {R1, R2, . . . , }, and that Ω = {S1, S2, . . . , }.
The Ramsey sentence of a Σ-theory T is then dened as generated from T by apply-
ing the following procedure:
1. Conjoin all the sentences of T into a single (perhaps innitely long) sentence,∧
T .
2. Replace eachn-ary predicate symbolRi ∈ Θ occurring in
∧
T by ann-ary second-
order variableXi, thereby obtaining an open second-order sentence; we will de-
note this T ∗.
3. Prex T ∗ by a (perhaps innite) string of second-order existential quantiers
∃X1∃X2 . . . , one for each free second-order variable in T ∗.
It is clear from this description that if T is an arbitrary rst-order theory, the language
in which the Ramsey sentence is formulated must have rather powerful logical re-
sources. If the cardinality of T is κ, and the cardinality of the subset of Σ occurring
in T is λ, then we are dealing with a second-order language that permits κ-many sen-
tences to be conjoined, and permits the introduction of λ-many second-order quan-
tiers. One topic that is not usually discussed in detail concerns what signature the
second-order language of the Ramsey sentence has. The most natural choice, how-
ever, is to suppose that the second-order signature is Ω; we will suppose this in what
follows.
3 The Newman problem
However, taking the Ramsey sentence to encode the “structural content” of a theory
has a seemingly disastrous consequence: if we Ramseyfy a theory, then we wash out
the theory’s non-observational content. More precisely, we have the following result.4
Proposition 1. Let T be a satisable theory. Suppose thatM is a second-order full
Ω-structure such that for some model N of T ,M and N are Ω-isomorphic: that is,
4cf. [Ainsworth, 2009, Theorem 5].
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that there is a bijection f : M → N such that for each Si ∈ Ω,
〈a1, . . . , an〉 ∈ (Si)M ⇔ 〈f(a1), . . . , f(an)〉 ∈ (Si)N (1)
ThenM |= TR.
Proof. For any extension E ⊆ Nn, dene the pullback of E by f to be
f ∗E := {〈a1, . . . , an〉 ∈Mn : 〈f(a1), . . . , f(an)〉 ∈ E} (2)
Given that for any Si ∈ Ω, f ∗(Si)N = (Si)M, we then have that
M[Xi 7→ f ∗(Ri)] |= T ∗ (3)
and hence, thatM |= TR.
The standard way of explaining why this result is problematic is as follows. LetW
be “the world”. Say that a theory is observationally adequate if it has a model which is
Ω-isomorphic to the world.5 The above result then shows that the Ramsey sentence
of T is true (of the world) if and only if T is observationally adequate. This is then
a Bad Thing, if the Ramsey sentence was supposed to be part of a realist strategy,
since realists (by denition) are those committed to more than just the observational
adequacy of scientic theories.6
However, I suggest that it is more illuminating to present the problem in terms of
theoretical equivalence. If the Ramsey sentence really captures the “structural con-
tent” of a theory, and if that structural content is the only content to which we ought
to be committed (or to which we are entitled to be committed), then we obtain a very
natural associated criterion of theoretical equivalence: two theories are equivalent just
in case they have logically equivalent Ramsey sentences. What Proposition 1 shows,
though, is that this criterion of equivalence is implausibly weak (at least, implausibly
weak for any position that aspires to be described as realist). For suppose that T1 and
T2 are two theories, with signatures Σ1 and Σ2 respectively, such that Ω1 = Ω2.7 Say
that T1 and T2 are Ω-equivalent if it is the case that for every model of T1, there is an Ω-
5cf. [van Fraassen, 1980, chap. 3]
6[Votsis, 2003] and [Zahar, 2004] both argue that—this result notwithstanding—the Ramsey sentence
does indeed go beyond the observational content of a theory. However, see [Ainsworth, 2009] for
some fairly convincing replies.
7Note that this condition is required if it is even to be possible that TR1 is logically equivalent to TR2 .
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isomorphic model of T2, and vice versa. It is straightforward to show from the above
that the following corollary holds:
Proposition 2. TR1 and TR2 are logically equivalent (under full second-order semantics)
if and only if T1 and T2 are Ω-equivalent.
Thus, Ramsey-sentence realism is justΩ-realism: two theories have equivalent Ram-
sey sentences if and only if their classes of models agree on the Ω-structure, and on
the cardinality of the underlying domain. Note that if we Ramseyfy all the predicates
of the theory—i.e., if Ω = ∅—then the only information retained by the theory is, at
best, information about cardinality.
What we have proved here is a fairly general result. From it, we can easily obtain
most of the other statements of the Newman problem found in the literature. For in-
stance, [Ketland, 2004] works in a two-sorted formalism, where there is a sort σΘ of
theoretical objects and another sort σΩ of observational objects. Ω then comprises all
predicates of sort 〈σΩ, . . . , σΩ〉 (i.e., those ranging only over tuples of observational
objects), whilst Θ contains all other predicates (i.e., those ranging over tuples of the-
oretical objects or tuples of observational and theoretical objects). Given a two-sorted
structureM, let |M|Ω := {a ∈ |M| : a is of sort σΩ}, and let |M|Θ := {a ∈ |M| :
a is of sort σΘ}.
We then say that a second-order two-sorted Ω-structureM is isomorphic to a rst-
order two-sorted Σ-structure N if there is a sort-preserving bijection f : |M| → |N |
such that for each Si ∈ Ω, (1) holds. It’s straightforward to show that the above result
then still holds, i.e., that ifM is Ω-isomorphic to a model N of T , thenM |= TR.
Ketland denes a modelN as empirically correct just in caseW is Ω-isomorphic (in this
sense) to N . Putting these ingredients together, we obtain Ketland’s main result: that
for any theory T , TR is true (ofW) i T has an empirically correct modelM such that
|W|Θ is equinumerous with |M|Θ.
The more general proposition, however, makes clear that the Newman problem is
not a function of particular aspects of Ketland’s treatment (such as the use of a two-
sorted formalism), but is a direct consequence of Ramseycation. This is important,
since some of the responses in the literature consider tweaking various aspects of ex-
actly how to cash out the observational/theoretical distinction, or else how to Ram-
seyfy. [Melia and Saatsi, 2006], for example, argue (contra Ketland) that the structural
realist is not required to Ramseyfy all mixed predicates; they claim that the structural
realist is entitled to refrain from Ramseyfying “structural” mixed predicates such as
“x is a part of y”, “x is located in region r”, or “x has velocity v”.
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But even if this is granted, Proposition 1makes clear that all this is somuchdeckchair-
shuing. If we Ramseyfy to any extent at all, then the Newman problemwill apply to
just that same extent; the only way the Newman problem could be entirely blocked is
if we Ramseyfy no vocabulary at all. Indeed, Melia and Saatsi go on to observe exactly
this point, i.e. that (in their words) “Even when predicates that apply to observables
and unobservables alike are handledwith the requisite care, there are still caseswhere
Ramseyed theories demand too little of the theoretical world.”8
4 Frame semantics
Nevertheless, there is a natural response to the Newman problem. This begins by
observing that Proposition 1 is a straightforward consequence of our decision to in-
terpret the Ramsey sentence in terms of the full semantics: that is, in such a way that
the second-order n-ary quantiers range over all sets of n-tuples in the model. As
soon as we have existentially quantied over the predicates in Θ, then it becomes far
too easy to nd extensions to witness them—if, that is, we are working with a full se-
mantics for second-order logic. But why should we do that? That is, what is it that
compels us to let the second-order quantiers range over every extension available in
the models?9 In this section, I consider proposals for how we might restrict the range
of the quantiers, and the semantics naturally associated with such proposals.
To restrict the range of the quantiers means supposing that, in a model, not all
subsets of the domain are created equal: some of them are privileged (namely, those
over which the quantiers range). Many discussions of the Newman problem are
highly sceptical that the structural realist is entitled to such a distinction between sets
of objects in the domain: Psillos, for example, argues that
in order for [(epistemic) structural realists] to distinguish between natu-
ral and non-natural classes they have to admit that some non-structural
knowledge is possible, viz. that some classes are natural, while others are
not.10
I do not nd this argument compelling. As we have seen, if no distinction between
dierent sets ofn-tuples is admitted, then nothing can havemore structure than that of
8[Melia and Saatsi, 2006, p. 571]
9In Ketland’s version of the Newman problem, the second-order quantiers in the Ramsey sentence
only range over extensions of the right sort; nevertheless, it remains the case that the Newman
problem arises because they range over all extensions of the right sort.
10[Psillos, 1999, p. 66]
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a bare set. Insofar as we have any grip on the notion of structure at all, it is presumably
drawn from our experience of mathematics, in which it is entirely standard for some
sets of objects to be privileged over others: the structure of a group G, for example,
arises exactly from the privilege accorded to the set containing those triples of the
form 〈g1, g2, g1 · g2〉 (as well as the privilege given to the singleton set {e}, and the set
containing the pairs of the form 〈g, g−1〉). As such, the fact that certain classes aremore
natural than others would seem to be a precondition on the possibility of structure at
all.
Resistance to this claimmay stem from a certain misreading of the structuralist the-
sis. The structural realist maintains that we can only have structural knowledge of the
world, i.e., that the only facts we can know about the world are structural facts. Let’s
grant, for the sake of argument, thatwhether a set of objects is a “natural” set (i.e. is the
extension of some natural property) is not a structural fact. It doesn’t follow that such
a fact is inadmissible to the structural realist, since the structural realist onlymaintains
that our knowledge of the world is purely structural; and a set of objects in the world
is not the same thing as the world itself. Again, consider the case of the group. It is
surely right that for an abstractly or algebraically described group, we know nothing
more about it than its structure. Nevertheless, we also know that certain sets of (tu-
ples of) objects in the group are privileged (natural). Our knowledge of the group is
purely structural; but that is consistent with (indeed, is in some sense constituted by)
our knowledge that certain sets of tuples of elements of the group are more natural than
others. Having only structural knowledge of some (structured) entity does not rule
out having knowledge of where the entity’s “joints” lie.11
So, there is not a prima facie reason why the structural realist may not distinguish
some extensions from others, and take the second-order quantiers to range only over
the distinguished extensions. However, that does not mean that doing so is not also
subject to diculties. In order to assess things, we need to get more precise about
what the proposal looks like.
First, we introduce the concept of a frame for second-order logic (also known as a
pre-structure).12 A frame F (of signature Σ) consists of
• A set F
• For each n ∈ N, a set EFn of subsets of F n (the extension-universe for F); let EF :=
∪n∈NEFn
11cf. [Redhead et al., 2001]
12The below follows [Manzano, 1996, chap. 4].
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• For each n ∈ N and n-ary Π ∈ Σ, a set ΠF ∈ EFn
A second-order variable-assignment G for a frame F assigns each n-ary variable to
some element of EFn . A frame provides sucient structure to interpret the language
L2(Σ): each set EFn gives the range of the second-order n-ary quantiers. (Note that
we require that the extension of each relation-letter fall in that range.) More precisely,
given rst- and second-order variable-assignments g andG, a frameF determines the
truth-value of formulae involving the second-order quantier via the clause
• F(g,G) |= ∃X(n)φ i for some A ∈ Fn, F(g,GAX) |= φ
Consequently, one can base a second-order semantics on frames (by taking validity to
be truth-in-all-frames, etc.), but the logic obtained is very weak. A correlate of this is
that the Ramsey sentence of a theory is very strong. Certainly, it is strong enough to
block the Newman problem as discussed above.
Example 1. Let Ω = ∅, Θ = {R} (where R is a unary predicate), and consider the
theory
T = {∃!x(x = x),∀xRx} (4)
Clearly,
TR = ∃X (∃!x(x = x) ∧ ∀xXx) (5)
Since Ω = ∅, Ω-isomorphism reduces to equinumerosity. But if we use the frame
semantics, then it is not the case that any pair of equinumerous frames must either
both satisfy or fail to satisfy TR. For example, the frame 〈{0}, {{0}}〉 is a model for TR,
whilst the equinumerous frame 〈{0},∅〉 is not.
The reason why the logic based on frame semantics is so weak is because there are
no constraints on what the privileged extensions in a frame are like. In particular,
just because a frame F privileges (say) a pair of unary extensions E and E ′, it doesn’t
follow that their “conjunction” {a ∈ |F| : a ∈ E and a ∈ E ′} is privileged in F .
This makes some sense if the privileged extensions are thought of as the extensions of
perfectly natural properties:13 such properties are fully metaphysically independent
from one another, and there is no reason (in general) why logical constructs out of
the extensions of two natural properties should be the extension of another natural
property.
13In (something like) the sense of [Lewis, 1983].
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However, there are good reasons to think that using frame semantics for the Ramsey
sentence does not deliver a conception of theoretical content that is anymore palatable
to the structural realist than that based on using full semantics—but for the opposite
reason. Using the full semantics meant, as we saw above, that it was too easy for two
theories to be Ramsey-equivalent: they needed only to agree on matters of cardinality
in order for their Ramsey sentences to be (full-)logically equivalent. Using the frame
semantics, however, makes it too hard for two theories to be Ramsey-equivalent. More
specically, there are denitionally equivalent theories whose Ramsey sentences are not
equivalent under the frame semantics.
To explain this, we need a little more apparatus. Suppose we have a single observa-
tional vocabulary Ω but disjoint theoretical vocabularies Θ1 and Θ2; let Σ1 := Ω ∪ Θ1
and Σ2 = Ω ∪ Θ2. For any n-ary R ∈ Θ2, an explicit denition of R in terms of Σ1 is a
formula δR of the form
∀x1 . . . ∀xn(Rx1 . . . xn ↔ τR(x1, . . . , xn)) (6)
where τR is an n-place Σ1-formula. A dictionary for Θ2 in terms of Σ1 is a set ∆ of
explicit denitions, one for each R ∈ Θ2. Given a dictionary ∆ for Θ2 in terms of
Σ1, any Σ1-structure S can be converted into a Σ2-structure ∆(S), by rst taking the
unique expansion of S to Σ1 ∪ Σ2 that satises ∆, and then taking the reduct to Σ2.
Now suppose that T1 and T2 are a pair of rst-order theories, in signaturesΣ1 andΣ2
respectively. A dictionary ∆ for Θ2 in terms of Σ1 is a translation manual for T2 in terms
of T1 if, for everymodelM of T1,∆(M) is amodel of T2. If there is a translationmanual
∆ for T2 in terms of T1 and a translation manual ∆′ for T1 in terms of T2, then we will
say that T1 and T2 are bi-interpretable. Since Ω is held xed, bi-interpretability implies
Ω-equivalence. If the translation manuals are such that T1 ∪∆ is logically equivalent
to T2 ∪∆′, then we say that T1 and T2 are denitionally equivalent; the theory T1 ∪∆ (or
the logically equivalent T2 ∪∆′) is referred to as the common denitional extension.
Recall that Ω includes, at least, all the observational vocabulary. This provides a
good reason for thinking that denitional equivalence, as dened here, should be
considered sucient for theoretical equivalence: denitionally equivalent theories are
empirically equivalent (in at least some sense), and their theoretical vocabularies are
entirely intertranslatable.14 Certainly, it seems that it would be a mistake for the struc-
tural realist to insist on a criterion of equivalence more ne-grained than denitional
14For arguments to this eect, see [Glymour, 1970], [Glymour, 1977].
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equivalence. If they are to see o the pessimistic meta-induction, then they will want
to regard theories as equivalent if they dene the same theoretical structures, even if
they do so using dierent basic resources—i.e., if they have a common denitional
extension.15 This is a problem for applying frame semantics to the Ramsey sentences
of theories: there are denitionally equivalent theories whose Ramsey sentences are
not frame-equivalent.
Example 2. Let T1 = {∃xFx}, T2 = {∃x¬Gx}. T1 and T2 are denitionally equivalent,
by the dictionaries
∆ = {∀x(Gx↔ ¬Fx)}






are not frame-equivalent. Indeed, let F be any frame such that EF1 = {|F|}. Then
F |= TR1 , but F 6|= TR2 .
5 Henkin semantics
This example suggests that the advocate of the Ramsey sentence should attend more
closely to the notion of denability. Roughly speaking, given a frame F , an extension
E over |F| is denable if there is some n-place formula φ such that E contains all and
only those n-tuples which satisfy φ. The most natural way to generate a more fruitful
semantics is to limit our attention to those frames which are closed under denabil-
ity: i.e., which are such that for any extension E denable over F , E ∈ EF . Say that
such a frame is a Henkin structure. The challenge, however, is that as we change what
language φ may be written in, we will get dierent conceptions of denability, and
15cf. Melia and Saatsi’s critique of restricting the second-order quantiers to range over just the
extensions of “natural” properties, on the grounds that some properties thought to be natu-
ral/fundamental later turn out to be somehow “disjunctive”; this is a problem for the structural
realist, they argue, since he “wants his Ramsey sentences to be preserved across theory change—
they are supposed to capture something that is constant between theories, else the structural re-
alist does little better than the full blown realist in dealing with the pessimistic meta-induction.”
[Melia and Saatsi, 2006, p. 576]
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hence dierent notions of Henkin structure.16 Moreover, we may want consider not
just (mere) denability, but the broader notion of denability with parameters. An exten-
sion E over a frame F is denable with parameters if there is (a) some formula ψ with
n or more free rst-order variables and zero or more second-order variables, (b) some
individuals from |F|, and (c) some extensions from EF , such that: E contains all and
only those n-tuples which satisfy ψ when its remaining free variables are assigned to
the chosen individuals and extensions. As we proceed, we will need to be somewhat
careful to keep an eye on this moving part in the account.
The reason to move to Henkin structures is that we are far more restricted in which
frames we can consider. For example, the frame F considered in Example 2 is not a
Henkin structure on any plausible unpacking of denability: the set F is denable
over F by a formula such as x = x, and so it at least would have to be included in the
extension-universe. More generally, by choosing a notion of denability for frames
designed to “mimic” denability over associated rst-order structures, we can show
that denitional equivalence is sucient for equivalence of Ramsey-sentences (under
the chosen Henkin semantics—and hence, under any Henkin semantics which per-
mits a richer notion of denability). In fact, we can show that not just denitional
equivalence, but bi-interpretability, is sucient. I turn to showing this now.
First, the relevant notion of denability. A formula of second-order logic is said to
be rst-order if it contains no second-order quantiers (note that a rst-order formula
is permitted to contain second-order variables). Given a frameF , over signature Ω, we
say that an extensionE overF is rst-order denable with second-order parameters if there
is some rst-order formula ψ ∈ L2(Ω)with free rst-order variables x1, . . . , xn and free
second-order variables Y1, . . . , Ym, and there are some extensions E1, . . . , Em ∈ EF ,
such that, for any a1, . . . , an ∈ |F|,
〈a1, . . . , an〉 ∈ E ⇔ F [Yi 7→ Ei, xj 7→ aj] |= ψ (9)
We then have the following result.
Proposition 3. Suppose that T1 and T2 are two bi-interpretable theories, in signatures
Σ1 = Ω ∪ Θ1 and Σ2 = Ω ∪ Θ2 respectively (where Ω = {Si}i, Θ1 = {R1j}j , and Θ2 =
{R2k}k). Then TR1 (wherein each R1j has been replaced by a variable X1j ) is logically
equivalent to TR2 (wherein eachR2k has been replaced by a variableX2k ), on the Henkin
16So my usage of the term “Henkin structure” is a little non-standard, given that I have not xed on a
specic notion of denability: usually, a Henkin structure is a frame which is closed under (specif-
ically) denability, with parameters, in the language of nitary second-order logic.
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semantics generated by rst-order denability with second-order parameters.
Proof. Suppose the proposition were false; then (without loss of generality) we can
suppose that there is some Henkin structureH (of signature Ω) such thatH |= TR1 but
H 6|= TR2 , where H is closed under rst-order denability with second-order parame-
ters.
Hence, H[G] |= T ∗1 , for some second-order variable-assignment G. So consider the
Σ1-structureM dened by





M = G(X1j ) (12)
Clearly,M |= T1.
Since T1 and T2 are bi-interpretable, we can use the translation manual ∆ for T2 in
terms of T1 to construct a model ∆(M) of T2. But now let G′ be any second-order





For any other n-ary second-order variable X , let G′(X) be some arbitrary element of
EHn .
I now show that G′ is a variable-assignment for H. Given any R2k ∈ Θ2, we know
that the formula τR2k (occurring in the denition δR2k of R
2
k in terms of Σ1, as per equa-
tion (6)) denes the extension (R2k)∆(M) inM. It cannot dene the extension in H,
however, since H is of signature Ω and τR2k is a Σ1-formula (and so will, in general,
contain predicates from Θ1). But now observe that for each j, G(X1j ) ∈ EH (since G
was an assignment for H); that means, by equation (12), that (R1j )M ∈ EH. So now




j ], i.e., the formula obtained by uniformly sub-
stituting variables Yj for the predicates R1j in Θ1. Note that τ ∗R2k is a rst-order formula
of L2(Ω): i.e., it has second-order variables but no second-order quantiers, and is of
signature Ω. If the second-order variables Yj are assigned to the parameters (R1j )M,
then τ ∗
R2k
denes the extension (R2k)∆(M). But since all of those parameters are in EH,
thatmeans that τ ∗
R2k
parametrically denes (R2k)∆(M) inH. Given thatH is closed under
rst-order denability with second-order parameters, it follows that (R2k)∆(M) ∈ EH.
By equation (13), this means that G′(X2k) ∈ EH. Therefore, for any second-order vari-
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ableX , ifX occurs in TR2 , then G′(X) ∈ EHn ; and by stipulation, ifX does not occur in
TR2 , then G′(X) ∈ EHn . So G′ is a variable-assignment forH.
But now, given that ∆(M) |= T2, it is clear that H[G′] |= T ∗2 . Therefore, H |= TR2 .
This contradicts our assumption, and so the proposition follows.
So moving to Henkin semantics, with its more restricted notion of a model, enables
us to avoid the problem canvassed in the previous section. However, there is a prob-
lem: with a suciently liberal conception of denability, perhaps it will turn out that
any Henkin model is forced to include all extensions—bringing us back to full seman-
tics, and hence to the Newman problem. This is how I read the following remarks of
Newman:
The only possibility of combating this objection [i.e., the Newman prob-
lem] seems to be to deny the truth of the proposition about relation-numbers
[i.e. extensions] on which it depends, namely that given an aggregate A,
there exists a system of relations, with any assigned structure compatible
with the cardinal number of A, having A as its eld. This involves aban-
doning or restricting Mr. Russell’s own denition of a relation, namely,
the class of all sets (x1, x2, . . . , xn) satisfying a given propositional function
φ(x1, x2 . . . , xn). If this denition is retained our assertion is clearly true.
For example if a, α, β, γ are any four objects whatever, a relation which
holds between a and α, a and β, and a and γ, but no other pairs is the
set of all couples, x and y, satisfying the propositional function
x is a, and y is α or β or γ (14)
Note that it is granted in the argument that we may only consider those extensions
which are denable. Newman’s claim, however, is that if we are allowed to freely
name elements of the domain, then restricting our attention to denable extensions is
no restriction at all: every relation will be denable by some means or other.
In more precise terms, the claim would be something like the following. Suppose
thatH is a Henkin structure over signature Σ, and that for every a ∈ |H|, there is some
constant α ∈ Σ such that αH = a. It then follows (says Newman) that every set of n-
tuples over |H| is denable, and hence that EHn = P(|H|n). A more modern way of
making Newman’s point would appeal to the notion of parametric denability, rather
than to the introduction of new constants. In those terms, the relevant claim is then
that for any Henkin structureH, every extension is parametrically denable.
14
It should be observed that the truth of this claim is not quite so trivial as Newman
makes out. In order to prove it, we need to suppose that the cardinality of |H| is no
greater than the cardinality of permissible disjunction in the language used to formu-
late denitions. If the language in which we formulate denitions permits disjunction
of κ-many formulae, then if |H| contains no more than κ-many elements, any exten-




1 ∧ x2 = yλ2 ∧ · · · ∧ xn = yλn) (15)
with parameters bλi , each of which gets assigned to yλi : here λ indexes the dierent
elements of E, so that for every 〈a1, . . . , an〉 ∈ E, there is some value of λ such that
bλi = ai (1 ≤ i ≤ n). The fact that |H| has no more than κ elements means that E has
no more than κ elements,17 and hence that the above disjunction is well-formed. As a
result, the claim is only true in full generality ifwe have noupper boundwhatsoever on
the formation of disjunctions in the dening language. That said, it is hard to see how
one couldmotivate such an upper bound, at least insofar as we are doingmetaphysics
rather than logic.
A better response to this trivialisation objection is to argue that the notion of de-
nability is too generous in a dierent way: the issue is not the expressive resources
available within the dening language, but rather the use of denability with param-
eters. Newman considers just such a response, which he puts as follows:
It may, however, be held that “real” relations can be distinguished from
“ctitious” ones; that the example just given is a ctitious one, while the
generating relation of the structure of theworld is real; and that there is not
always a real relation having an assigned structure and a given eld. Here
“ctitious” has awell dened sense; it means that the relation is onewhose
only property is that it holds between the objects that it does hold between;
i.e., the propositional function dening it is of the type (14) above.18
[Melia and Saatsi, 2006] consider a similar proposal: rather than the “real/ctitious”
distinction, they consider the distinction between qualitative properties (those “tied
to what the objects are like, the kinds of features that they have, the qualities that they
17Unless κ is nite—but in that case,E will have only nitelymany elements. So unless we areworking
in a (very strange) language with nite bounds on disjunction, this won’t be a problem.
18[Newman, 1928, p. 145]
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possess”)19 and non-qualitative properties (properties such as “being identical to a, b or
c”)20.
The most natural way of making this precise is to restrict ourselves to denability
without rst-order parameters. Of course, in structures in which everything carries a
name, then this is no limitation (as the Newman quote above points out); but not all
structures are like that. (It seems that we should still admit denability by second-
order parameters, since we want to allow that “theoretical” properties—i.e., proper-
ties whose corresponding predicates we are seeking to Ramseyfy—are still qualitative
properties.)
Even without getting any more specic about the language of denition, we can
show that if denability with rst-order parameters is excluded, then not all Henkin
structures are full structures. The basic observation here—which is a standard piece
of model theory—is that if a set is denable (without rst-order parameters), then it
is invariant under automorphisms. That is, let h be an automorphism of the frame F ,
i.e., a bijection h : |F| → |F| such that for every E ∈ EF ,
〈a1, . . . , an〉 ∈ E ⇔ 〈h(a1), . . . , h(an)〉 ∈ E (16)
It will take only a straightforward proof by induction to show that, for any formula
ψ(x1, . . . , xn, Y1, Y2, . . . ),
F [Yi 7→ Pi, xj 7→ aj] |= ψ ⇔ F [Yi 7→ Pi, xj 7→ h(aj)] |= ψ (17)
Thus, if the extensionD is dened by ψ (with respect to the second-order parameters
Pi), then for any a1, . . . , an ∈ |F|,
〈a1, . . . , an〉 ∈ D ⇔ 〈h(a1), . . . , h(an)〉 ∈ D (18)
But if F admits some non-trivial automorphism (i.e., an automorphism which is not
the identity map), then not all sets will be invariant under all automorphisms; from
which it follows that not all sets are denable. So we are not facing the same level of
trivialisation as we had before.
Nevertheless, that does not mean that there is no threat of trivialisation. Melia and
Saatsi, after making the above argument, go on to claim that it only provides a short
19[Melia and Saatsi, 2006, p. 577]
20[Melia and Saatsi, 2006, p .578]
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respite for the Ramsey-philiac:21
Unfortunately, though attractive, restricting the quantiers to qualitative
properties is too weak to stave o Newman-style arguments for very long.
True, restricting the second order quantier in this manner implies that it
is not necessarily true that whenever you have a set of objects there is one
and only one property that those objects instantiate. The possibility of sym-
metricworlds [i.e., modelswith non-trivial automorphisms] demonstrated
that. But worlds showing such symmetry are extremely rare. Where a
world lacks this level of symmetry, it will be the case that, again, for ev-
ery set of objects there is a qualitative property that the members of this
set, and only the members of this set, instantiate. If the world is such that
every object has a unique qualitative property then, by forming the rele-
vant disjunction, every set of objectswill correspond to a unique qualitative
property too.22
On our assimilation of qualitative properties to the notion of denability without
rst-order parameters, this argument requires the converse of the principle discussed
above: i.e., it requires the claim that if an extension E over a frame F is invariant un-
der every automorphism of F , then E is denable (without rst-order parameters).
Again, so long as we are willing to grant the dening language as much expressive
power as necessary, then this claim seems plausible. It will indeed then follow that in
rigid frames (those with no non-trivial automorphisms), every extension is denable,
so that we face triviality once again.
In addition to this, I want to adduce one more problem for the move to Henkin
semantics, even if we do x on some limited conception of denability (and hence
avoid the trivialisation results). The concern is that even with such limits, the notion
of equivalence associated with Ramsey sentences interpreted by Henkin semantics
is too weak: even with a fairly limited dening language, there are theories which
seem intuitively inequivalent, which nevertheless generate Ramsey sentences that are
equivalent (with respect to the Henkin semantics). Note that this problem will not be
resolved by appeal to a richer notion of denability. As we enrich the dening lan-
guage, we make it harder for something to be a Henkin structure (since it is harder
for it to be closed under denability); we therefore make it easier for a pair of Ramsey
21Newman has his own reply to this response (at [Newman, 1928, pp. 145–146]); I confess, however,
that I don’t fully understand his reply.
22[Melia and Saatsi, 2006, p. 578]
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sentences to have all their Henkin models in common, i.e., move to a weaker notion of
equivalence. (To put it another way, the problem with full semantics was that the as-
sociated notion of equivalence was too weak, and the problem with frame semantics
was that the associated notion of equivalence was too strong. Enriching the den-
ing language moves us towards full semantics, i.e., in the direction associated with a
weaker notion of equivalence.)
More specically, consider again the Henkin semantics generated by rst-order de-
nability with second-order parameters. We saw above that bi-interpretability is a
sucient condition for Ramsey-equivalence with respect to this semantics. The fol-
lowing example shows, however, that it is not a necessary condition: there are Ramsey-
equivalent theories (with respect to this semantics) which are not bi-interpretable.
Example 3. Let Σ1 = {P0, P1, . . . , }, and let Σ2 = {Q0, Q1, . . . }. Let T1 = ∅, and
T2 = {∀x(Q0x → Qix)}i∈N. T1 and T2 are not bi-interpretable: there is no way of
dening Q0 in terms of Σ1. However, their Ramsey-sentences,
TR1 = > (19)
TR2 = ∃X0∃X1 . . . [∀x(X0x→ X1x) ∧ ∀x(X0x→ X2x) ∧ · · · ] (20)
are Henkin-equivalent, since TR2 is a theorem of Henkin semantics. For, given any
Henkin structureH, the setH is denable by the formula x = x. So ifG is any variable-
assignment such that Xi 7→ H for all i ∈ N, thenH[G] |= T ∗2 , and henceH |= TR2 .
This is a problem if one thought that bi-interpretability was a plausible necessary
condition on theoretical equivalence.
6 Modalising the Ramsey sentence
So, one way or the other, it does not look like Henkin semantics is the magic bul-
let we might have hoped for. To think about a solution, start with the last problem
we raised for Henkin semantics. Why might one think that bi-interpretability is an
appropriate necessary condition for equivalence? [Halvorson, 2012], in discussing an
example very similar to example 3 above, observes that the two theories are intuitively
inequivalent because “the rst theory tells us nothing about the relations between
the predicates, but the second theory stipulates a nontrivial relation between one of
the predicates and the rest of them.”23 That is, T2 (unlike T1) says that there is some
23[Halvorson, 2012, p. 193]
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predicate such that in eachmodel, anything satisfying that predicate satises all other
predicates. That content gets lost in TR2 , since all TR2 says is that in each model, there
are some (denable) predicates such that anything satisfying the rst satises all the
others. (That is, we move from a claim of the form “there is . . . such that for all . . . ” to
a claim of the form “for all . . . there is . . . ”.)
In more metaphysical terms, the problem is that the original theory T2 cared about
the transworld identity of properties in a way that TR2 does not. Putting things this
way suggests an association to the account that [Melia and Saatsi, 2006] give of the
problems with the Ramsey sentence:
The properties postulated in scientic theories are typically taken to stand
in certain intensional relations to various other properties. Some proper-
ties counterfactually depend on others, some are correlated in a law-like man-
ner with others, some are independent of others, and some are explanatory
of others. In the model theoretic arguments considered so far, the logical
frame-work in which Ramseycation takes place is not capable of saying
that such relations between properties hold.24
So, howmight we seek to capture such relations between properties (or predicates)
in the form of a Ramsey-sentence-style construction? Melia and Saatsi make the fol-
lowing suggestions:
There are a number of ways to formalise intensional relations between
properties. The simplest way would be to introduce new higher order re-
lational predicates into one’s theory. Alternatively, since many of the rela-
tions between properties that are of interest to us are certain kinds ofmodal
associations, one could augment the relevant formal system with modal
operators and use them to express these modal relations. So, for instance,
let LP express ‘it is physically necessary that. . . ’. Then ∃XLP∀x(Xx↔ Gx)
says that there is a property which is lawfully coextensive with G.25
Here, I consider the latter suggestion: thatwe formulate our Ramsey-style sentences
using modal operators. Specically, suppose that we supplement our language L2(Ω)
with the sentential necessity operator, thereby obtaining a modal second-order lan-
guageML2(Ω). The intended interpretation of this operator is that of expressing phys-
ical necessity (just like Melia and Saatsi’s LP operator). Taking inspiration fromMelia
24[Melia and Saatsi, 2006, pp. 579–580]
25[Melia and Saatsi, 2006, pp. 580–581]
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and Saatsi’s example sentence, let us say that the Melia-Saatsi sentence of a theory T
is theML2(Ω) sentence
TMS := ∃X0∃X1 . . .T ∗ (21)
where T ∗ is as before.
As before, this raises the question of what semantics we are using to interpret the
Melia-Saatsi sentence. Given that Melia and Saatsi argue vigorously against the co-
gency of restricting the second-order quantiers, the natural suggestion is that they
envision the Melia-Saatsi sentence being interpreted by something like full Kripke se-
mantics. A full Kripke structure K, for a signature Σ, consists of the following data:
• A setW (of worlds)
• For each w ∈ W , a set Dw (of individuals at that world)
• For each n-ary Π ∈ Σ, an intension over K: i.e., a map Π• : w ∈ W 7→ Πw ⊆ Dn
Thus, for our language ML2(Ω), a full Kripke structure may be written in the form
〈W,D•, {S•i }〉. Such a full Kripke structure K = 〈W,D•, {S•i }〉 evaluates formulae of
ML2(Ω) relative to a world w ∈ W , a rst-order variable-assignment g : Var → Dw,
and a modal second-order variable-assignment Γ. A modal second-order variable-
assignment assigns each second-order variable to some intension I overK, i.e., to some
map of the form w 7→ Iw ⊆ Dw.
Unfortunately, however, the Melia-Saatsi sentence (interpreted by full Kripke se-
mantics) suers from a Newman-style problem. More specically, we have the fol-
lowing result.26
Proposition 4. Let T be a satisable theory. Suppose that K = 〈W,D•, {S•i }〉 is a full
Kripke structure such that for each w ∈ W , there is a modelM ∈ Mod(T ) such that
M is Ω-isomorphic to to w. Then K |= TMS .
Proof. Let f : W → Mod(T ) be a map taking each world to an Ω-isomorphic model;
and for each w ∈ W , let hw : Dw → Df(w) be an Ω-isomorphism. Let Γ be a modal
second-order variable-assignment such that
Γ(Ri) : w 7→ h∗(Rf(w)i ) (22)
where h∗ denotes pullback under h. It then follows that for any w ∈ W , K[Γ, w] |= T ∗;
hence, that K[Γ] |= T ∗; and hence, that K |= TMS .
26This result generalises the observations of [Yudell, 2010, §7].
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Hence, in order for a full Kripke structure to be amodel of theMelia-Saatsi sentence,
it suces that each of its worlds be Ω-isomorphic to somemodel of the theory. Clearly,
this is still a rather weak condition; so the Melia-Saatsi sentence, interpreted by full
Kripke semantics, is not a plausible candidate for capturing the structural content of
a theory. But there is a natural next move: combine the tricks we have considered so
far. That is, perhaps if we both modalise and restrict the range of the quantiers, then
we will get somewhere. I now turn to evaluating this proposal.
7 Modal Henkin semantics
Let a modal frame F for the languageML2(Ω) consist of
• A setW
• For each w ∈ W , a set Dw
• For each n ∈ N, a set IFn of n-ary intensions over F ; let IF = ∪n∈NIFn
• For each n-ary Si ∈ Ω, an intension SFi ∈ IFn
Given aworldW , amodal second-order variable-assignmentΓ and arst-order variable-
assignment g, amodal frame evaluates formulae involving the second-order quantier
via the clause
• F [w,Γ, g] |= ∃X(n)φ i for some I ∈ IFn , F [w,ΓXI , g] |= φ
Amodal frame can be written in the form 〈W,D•, {S•i }, I〉. Given amodal frameF , an
n-ary intension I over F is denable just in case there is some n-place formula φ such
that the extension of φ at eachw ∈ W coincides with the value of the intension forw. It
is denable with second-order parameters if there is some formula φwith n free rst-
order variables and k free second-order variables and some intensions J1, . . . , Jk ∈ IF ,
such that when the second-order variables are assigned to J1, . . . , Jk, the extension of
φ at each w ∈ W coincides with the value of the intension for w. (Denability with
rst-order parameters gets a little complicated in the modal case; given that we have
already rehearsed reasons to avoid such denability, I will not bother formulating it.)
Amodal frame semantics does not seem like it would be helpful (for the same reasons
as discussed in section 4 above); but we can consider modalised Henkin semantics, by
restricting to frames whose intension-universes are closed under denability (in some
language, and possibly with second-order parameters).
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An immediate advantage of this approach is that we do not have the trivialisation
problems that arose for non-modal Henkin semantics. Recall that the problem was
that even if we rule out denability with rst-order parameters, any suciently non-
symmetric Henkin model will (assuming an arbitrarily powerful dening language)
be a full model. This objection is not compelling in this case. Even if we require that
every world of a modal Henkin model be non-symmetric (i.e., admit no non-trivial
automorphisms), it will not follow that every intension is denable, as the following
example illustrates.
Example 4. Let Ω = {P (1)1 , P (1)2 }, and consider the following modal Ω-frame F =
〈W,D•, {P •i }i=1,2, I〉:
W = {w1, w2}
Dw1 = {1, 2}





I = {P •1 , P •2 }
Note that no world in W admits any non-trivial automorphisms. Now consider the
intension I dened by
Iw1 = {1}
Iw2 = {4}
This intension is not denable in F . For, consider the map f : w1 → w2 such that
f(1) = 3
f(2) = 4
This map is a homomorphism: it is a standard result from model theory, therefore,
that for any 1-place formula φ(x) ∈ L1(Ω) and any a ∈ Dw1 , if F [w1, x 7→ a] |= φ
then F [w2, x 7→ f(a)] |= φ. Since 1 ∈ Iw1 but 3 6∈ Iw2 , it immediately follows that
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no such formula φ can dene I . Moreover, given that the intension-universe of F is
just {P •1 , P •2 }, the same reasoning applies to any rst-order formula φwith free second-
order variables. Thus, the intension I is not denable overF (with or without second-
order parameters).
This approach also overcomes the second problem canvassed above for the Henkin-
semantics approach to Ramsey sentences (i.e., that bi-interpretability was not neces-
sary for Ramsey-equivalence). This time, we are able to show that, with an appropri-
ate choice of dening language, a pair of theories are Ramsey-equivalent if and only if
they are bi-interpretable. The “appropriate choice” is themodal analogue of the den-
ing language used in Proposition 3. More specically, given a modal frame F , over
signature Ω, we say that an intension I over F is rst-order denable with second-order
parameters if there is some rst-order formula ψ ∈ L2(Ω) with free rst-order variables
x1, . . . , xn and free second-order variables Y1, . . . , Ym, and there are some intensions
I1, . . . , Im ∈ IF , such that, for any w ∈ WF , for any a1, . . . , an ∈ Dw,
〈a1, . . . , an〉 ∈ Iw ⇔ F [Yi 7→ Ii, w, xj 7→ aj] |= ψ (23)
We then have the following result.
Proposition 5. Suppose that T1 and T2 are two theories, in signatures Σ1 = Ω ∪ Θ1
and Σ2 = Ω ∪ Θ2 respectively (where Ω = {Si}i, Θ1 = {R1j}j , and Θ2 = {R2k}k). Then
T1 and T2 are bi-interpretable if and only if TMS1 (wherein each R1j has been replaced
by a variable X1j ) is logically equivalent to TMS2 (wherein each R2k has been replaced
by a variable X2k ), on the Henkin semantics generated by rst-order denability with
second-order parameters.
Proof. The left-to-right direction strongly resembles the proof of Proposition 3. So,
suppose that T1 and T2 are bi-interpretable, but that their Melia-Saatsi sentences are
not logically equivalent (under the given semantics). Without loss of generality, we
can suppose that there is some Henkin structureH such thatH |= TMS1 butH 6|= TMS2 ,
whereH is closed under rst-order denability with second-order parameters.
Hence, H[Γ] |= T ∗1 , for some modal second-order variable-assignment Γ; and
hence, for each w ∈ W , H[Γ, w] |= T ∗1 . So now, for each w, consider the Σ1-structure
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Mw dened by
|Mw| = Dw (24)
(Si)
Mw = (Si)w (25)
(R1j )
Mw = Γ(X1j )
w (26)
Clearly,Mw |= T1.
Since T1 and T2 are bi-interpretable, we can use the translation manual ∆ for T2 in
terms of T1 to construct a model ∆(Mw) of T2. But now let Γ′ be any modal second-
order variable-assignment such that, for any second-order variable X2k occurring in




For any other n-ary second-order variable X , let Γ′(X) be some arbitrary element of
IHn .
I now show that Γ′ is a variable-assignment forH. Given anyR2k ∈ Θ2, we know that
the formula τR2k denes the extension (R
2
k)
∆(Mw) inMw. Now observe that for each j,
Γ(X1j ) ∈ IH (since Γ was an assignment for H); that means, by equation (26), that
the intension (w 7→ (R1j )Mw) ∈ IH. So now consider the formula τ ∗R2k := τR2k [Yj/R
1
j ],
i.e., the formula obtained by uniformly substituting variables Yj for the predicates
R1j in Θ1. Note that this formula is rst-order (albeit with second-order variables),
and of signature Ω. If the second-order variables Yj are assigned to the parameters
(w 7→ (R1j )Mw), then τ ∗R2k denes the intension (w 7→ (R
2
k)
∆(Mw)). But since all of those
parameters are in IH, that means that τ ∗
R2k
parametrically denes (w 7→ (R2k)∆(Mw)) in
H. Given thatH is closed under rst-order denabilitywith second-order parameters,
it follows that (w 7→ (R2k)∆(Mw)) ∈ IH. By equation (27), this means that Γ′(X2k) ∈ IH.
Therefore, for any second-order variableX , ifX occurs in TR2 , then Γ′(X) ∈ IHn ; and by
stipulation, ifX does not occur in TR2 , then Γ′(X) ∈ IHn . So Γ′ is a variable-assignment
forH.
But now, given that∆(Mw) |= T2 for everyw, it is clear thatH[Γ′, w] |= T ∗2 for eachw;
hence, thatH[Γ′] |= T ∗2 ; and hence, thatH |= TMS2 . This contradicts our assumption,
so the left-to-right half of the proposition follows.
Before proving the converse direction, we need the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Let F be a modal frame over signature Σ, such that IF consists of all and only
those intensions denable (without parameters) by some formula of L1(Σ). LetH be the reduct
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of F to Ω, i.e., the frame such that




IH = IF (30)
(PH)w = (PF)w, for each P ∈ Σ (31)
ThenH is a Henkin structure in the sense considered here: that is, IH is closed under rst-order
denability with second-order parameters.
Proof. Suppose that the lemmawere false; that is, that therewere some n-ary intension
I which is not in IH, but is denable overH by some rst-order formula with second-
order parameters. Then there is some ψ ∈ L2(Ω), with free variables x1, . . . , xn and
Y1, . . . , ym, such that ψ dene I with respect to some parameters I1, . . . , Im ∈ IH. It
follows that for each Ii, there is some formula ψi ∈ L1(Σ) which denes Ii. So now
consider the formula ψ[ψi/Yi]. For any world w ∈ WH,
H[Yi 7→ Ii, w, xj 7→ aj] |= ψ iH[w, xj 7→ aj] |= ψ[ψi/Yi] (32)
and hence, ψ[ψi/Yi] is a formula ofL1(Ω), which denes the intension I . It follows that
I ∈ IH after all; so by contradiction, the lemma follows.
We can now prove the converse half of our result. First, we dene a frame F , of
signature Σ1, as follows:
WF = Mod(T1) (33)
DFM = M , for anyM∈ Mod(T1) (34)
(SFi )
M = (Si)M (35)
((R1i )
F)M = (R1i )
M (36)
and IF consists of all and only those intensions over F which are denable by some
formula of L1(Σ1). Then, let H be the reduct of F to Ω; by the lemma, H is a modal
Henkin structure.
LetΓ be anymodal second-order variable-assignment such that, for anyM∈ Mod(T1),
Γ(X1i )
M = (Ri)M (37)
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Then for anyM∈ WH,H[Γ,M] |= T ∗1 , soH[Γ] |= T ∗1 , soH |= TMS1 .
Therefore, by the equivalence of TMS1 and TMS2 , H |= TMS2 . So for some modal
second-order variable-assignment Γ′ forH, and for anyM∈ Mod(T1),
H[Γ′,M] |= T ∗2 (38)
Since Γ′ is a variable-assignment for H, we know that for any k, Γ′(X2k) ∈ IH; hence,
for some φk ∈ L1(Σ1), φk denes Γ′(X2k) overH. Hence, the formula
∀x1 . . . ∀xn(R2kx1 . . . xn ↔ φk) (39)
is an explicit denition of R2k in terms of Σ1. By repeating this process for all k, we
obtain a dictionary ∆ for Θ2 in terms of Σ1.
Finally, note that given anyM∈ Mod(T1),
(R2k)
∆(M) = (φk)M = Γ′(X2k)
M (40)
and hence, by equation (38), ∆(M) |= T2. So ∆ is not just a dictionary, but a trans-
lation manual for T2 in terms of T1. By repeating the above in the other direction,
we can construct a translation manual for T1 in terms of T2. Therefore, T1 and T2 are
bi-interpretable.
This result is a reason to think that of the options canvassed so far, this proposal (or
something like it) is the best hope for something like a Ramsey-sentence approach.
What it shows is that the Melia-Saatsi sentence of a theory, if interpreted using modal
Henkin semantics, captures precisely the content of a theory which is invariant un-
der bi-interpretability: if you prefer, precisely the content which is shared by a pair
of bi-interpretable theories. At rst glance, this might seem like a fairly reasonable
condition, especially given the following fact: a dictionary ∆ for Θ2 in terms of Σ1 is
a translation manual for T2 in terms of T1 if and only if for every consequence φ of
T1, ∆φ is a consequence of T2—where ∆φ is the Σ2-formula obtained by uniformly
substituting the formula τR for every occurrence of R in φ, for all R ∈ Θ2. So, given
a pair of theories T1 and T2, a translation manual for T2 in terms of T1 gives a means
of “embedding” all the content of T1 into that of T2: everything that T1 says is con-
verted, by the translation manual, into something that T2 says. So if everything that
T1 says can be converted into something that T2 says and vice versa (i.e., if T1 and T2
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are bi-interpretable), does it not follow that T1 and T2 say the same thing?
Unfortunately, the answer turns out to be no—or at least, to follow only with an
implausible conception of “saying the same thing”. The following example shows that
bi-interpretability is an implausible criterion of theoretical equivalence, since there are
bi-interpretable theories which one has good reason to consider inequivalent.27
Example 5. Let Ω = ∅, Θ1 = {P}, and Θ2 = {Q,R} (where P , Q and R are all unary
predicates). Consider the following pair of theories:
T1 = {∀x(Px ∨ ¬Px)}
T2 = {∀x(Qx→ Rx)}
Intuitively, T1 and T2 are inequivalent: T1 is a triviality, true in every Σ1-model, whilst




This is a translationmanual for T2 in terms ofT1. For, given anymodelM ofT1 (i.e., any
Σ1-structure), ∆(M) is a Σ2-structure in which whatever set constituted the extension
of P inM is now the extension of both Q and R. Thus, ∆(M) |= T2. On the other
hand, consider the following dictionary ∆′ for Θ1 in terms of Σ2:
∀x(Px↔ Qx) (41)
This is a translation manual for T1 in terms of T2. For, given any modelN of T2, ∆′(N )
will be a Σ1-structure—and hence, a model of T1. So T1 and T2 are bi-interpretable.28
27Further examples besides this one may be adduced: for instance, the pair of theories in Example 4
of [Barrett and Halvorson, MS] are bi-interpretable. This shows that completeness of theories is not
preserved under bi-interpretability.
28Thus, by Proposition 5, they have equivalence Melia-Saatsi sentences. This may be seen directly by
observing that the Melia-Saatsi sentence of T2 is
TMS2 = ∃X1∃X2∀x(X1x→ X2x) (42)
which is a logical validity under modal Henkin semantics. For, in any modal Henkin structure H,
if Γ is an assignment such that Γ(X1) = Γ(X2), thenH[Γ] |= T ∗2 .
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8 Conclusion
One response, of course, is to think that some further ingenious tweak to the notion
of a Ramsey sentence will see o the problem. In this nal section, I wish to explain
why I am pessimistic about the prospects of doing so.
First, note that Example 5 will persist as a problem if wemove to anymodal second-
order semantics which is stronger than that employed here. If we use any form of se-
mantics in which frames are closed under rst-order denability with second-order
parameters, then the left-to-right direction of Proposition 5will apply, and bi-interpretability
will be sucient for logical equivalence of theMelia-Saatsi sentences. To put the same
point anotherway: strengthening the semanticsmeans allowing fewer frames to count
as structures; that makes it easier for two theories to have logically equivalent Melia-
Saatsi sentences (i.e., Melia-Saatsi sentences satised by exactly the same structures);
and hence, it leads to a more liberal criterion of equivalence. But Example 5 is exactly
a concern that the criterion of equivalence we have arrived at is too liberal—so further
liberalising it will hardly help!
The alternative, then, is to weaken the semantics. This will lead to a stricter criterion
of theoretical equivalence, whichmay then enable us to rule out Example 5. The prob-
lem is that we are then apt to run into cases like Example 2: i.e., cases showing that the
associated criterion of theoretical equivalence is stricter than denitional equivalence.
The following proposition gives a sucient condition for this to occur.
Proposition 6. Suppose that F is a modal frame over signature Ω = {Si}i, and that
there is a formula ψ with free variables x1, . . . , xn and Y1, . . . , Ym such that for any
intensions I1, . . . , Im ∈ IF (with Ii of the same arity as Yi), the intension Iψ dened
by ψ with respect to the parameters I1, . . . , Im is not in IF . Then, for any semantics
under which F is admissible as a structure, one can have denitionally equivalent
theories whose Melia-Saatsi sentences are not logically equivalent (with respect to
that semantics).
Proof. First, dene Θ1 = {R11, . . . , R1m}, and let Σ1 = Ω∪Θ1. Then take some particular
sequence of intensions I1, . . . , Im ∈ IF , with Ii of the same arity as Yi, and for every
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w ∈ WF , dene a rst-order Σ1-structureMw as follows:









T1 = {φ :Mw |= φ for every w ∈ WF} (46)
Second, let Θ2 = {R21, . . . , R2m, R}, and let
T2 = {φ[R2i /R1i ] : φ ∈ T1} ∪ {∀x1 . . . ∀xn(Rx1 . . . xn ↔ ψ[R2i /Yi](x1, . . . , xn)) (47)
Clearly, T1 and T2 are denitionally equivalent.
I now show thatF |= TMS1 . First, letG be amodal second-order variable-assignment
such that G(x1i ) = Ii. For any world w ∈ WF , a straightforward proof by induction
will demonstrate that for any φ ∈ L1(Σ1) and any rst-order variable-assignment g for
Mw, ifMw[g] |= φ then F [G,w, g] |= φ[X1i /R1i ]. Thus, sinceMw |= φ for all sentences
φ ∈ T1, and given the denition of T ∗1 , we have that F [G,w] |= T ∗1 . Since this holds for
all w ∈ WF , we obtain F [G] |= T ∗1 ; and hence, F |= TMS1 .
It remains only to show thatF 6|= TMS2 . So suppose that this were not the case. Then
for some modal second-order variable-assignment G′ for F , F [G′] |= T ∗2 . Thus, in
particular,
F [G′, w] |= ∀x1 . . . ∀xn(Xx1 . . . xn ↔ ψ[X2i /Yi](x1, . . . , xn)) (48)
for every w ∈ WF . But now let I ′i := G′(X2i ), and let I ′ := G′(X). Then it follows that
for any w ∈ WF and any a1, . . . , an ∈ Dw,
〈a1, . . . , an〉 ∈ (I ′)w ⇐⇒ F [Yi 7→ I ′i, w, xj 7→ aj] |= ψ (49)
Hence, I ′ is dened byψwith respect to the parameters I ′1, . . . , I ′m. But then by hypoth-
esis, I ′ 6∈ IF , and soG′ is not a variable-assignment forF after all. So by contradiction,
the proposition follows.
The hypothesis of Proposition 8 is stronger than merely supposing that F is not
closed under rst-order denability with respect to second-order parameters: the lat-
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ter condition would require only that for some sequence of parameters, the intension
dened by ψ with respect to those parameters is not in IF . Still, it is hard to see how
structures of the form of F could be decisively ruled out without imposing that clo-
sure condition; and as soon as we have done so, we are subject to counterexamples of
the form of Example 5. This suggests that ddling with exactly which semantics to
employ is unlikely to help.
Another way of seeing this is to observe that the dierence between denitional
equivalence and bi-interpretability is not based on a dierence over how to unpack the
notion of denition: by contrast, the same notion of denition is used in both. Def-
initional equivalence strengthens bi-interpretability, not by changing the conditions
on what is apt to count as a translation, but by requiring that the pair of translations
relate to one another in a certain kind of way: namely, that they are inverse to one an-
other.29 This is a distinction that the Ramsey-sentence approaches considered in this
paper are simply blind to.
In other words, the problem here is not that we are failing to consider the right
kind of Ramsey-sentence construction, or the right kind of semantics for interpreting
such a construction. Rather, the issue is something more fundamental: it does not
appear that one can isolate some specic construction that it is appropriate to identify
as the structural content of a theory. This suggests an importantmethodological lesson.
Structural realists are often challenged to explicate their view, and to explain exactly
what they mean by the “structural content” of a theory. The way they have typically
sought to do this is by writing down some new theory, which (they claim) captures all
and only the structural content of the old, without any of the descriptive u. If the
above is correct, then this kind of approach is misguided.
So much the worse for structural realism? Not necessarily, for the analysis above
suggests an alternative. I observed above that if the Ramsey sentence (or something
like it) captures the “real” content of a theory, then that naturally induces an associ-
ated criterion of theoretical equivalence;30 much of my critique was based on showing
that the criteria so obtained were implausible criteria for theoretical equivalence. So
perhaps the problem is that we are putting the cart before the horse. After all, the
notion of a fully u-free presentation of a theory is a fantasy; any presentation of
a theory will incorporate some inessential representational features (the colour of the
ink, the typeface, etc.). So rather than questing after such chimeras, perhapswe should
29See [Barrett and Halvorson, MS].
30cf. [Coey, 2014]
30
specify the content of a theory by saying what it would take for two theories to agree
in their content: that is, by endorsing a criterion of theoretical equivalence. For struc-
tural realists, this means specifying a criterion of structural equivalence. Translational
equivalence (perhaps with a xed specication of how to translate between the obser-
vational vocabularies of the two theories) seems like a plausible candidate, at least for
the kinds of theories discussed in this paper. In a slogan: the philosophers have only
extracted the content of a theory, in various ways; the point, however, is to abstract it.
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